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Wreckage identified as that of the FITZGERALD was located in position 46 59.91 N’, 85 06.6’ W in 530 feet of water in eastern Lake Superior just north of the International Boundary in Canadian waters. This position correlates with the last position of the FITZGERALD as reported by the ANDERSON. The wreckage lies approximately 17 miles northwest of Whitefish Point, Michigan. The wreckage consists of an upright bow section, an inverted stern section, and debris from a missing 200-foot midship portion. The bow section is 276 feet long, inclined 15 degrees to port from the upright, extends from the stem to a location between hatches Nos. 8 and 9, and is buried in mud up to the 28-foot draft mark. Canadian Chart 2310, "Lake Superior, Caribou Island to Michipicoten Island," which shows the area from slightly north of Michipicoten Island to slightly south of Caribou Island at a scale of 1:97,280 is published by the Canadian Hydrographic Service. After this accident, the Coast Guard requested the Canadian Hydrographic Service to conduct a hydrographic survey of the area north of Caribou Island to confirm the charted soundings and to update the charted data. Current charts are based on a survey conducted by the Canadian Hydrographic Service in 1916 and 1919. Columbia Transportation Division, the operator of the FITZGERALD, conducted an independent hydrographic survey of the shoal area north of Caribou Island. Water depths were determined by sonic devices, lead line, and direct measurement by divers. The results of this survey show water depths that vary slightly from the Canadian survey. These differences can be attributed to the rocks and boulders on the bottom and the various tracklines on which soundings were recorded. S.S. Edmund
Fitzgerald Draft Marks = 1" = 135 Tons per inch of draft "The Pressure is on what to say after the Wreck" "Maybe he didn’t go in there (close to Caribou Island)."Here what was said the next day after the lost - Why did the Facts change only one time for the Official Report? Radio Transmissions from ship to Coast Guard Listen Phone call from Captain to office Listen
Six-Fathom
Shoal
Despite many people
accepting this as the most likely scenario for the sudden list and
deck damage, the photographic evidence for such a grounding may exist.
Every expedition to the freighter has reported that there is some
scraping, gouging or damage to the rudder or propeller, which should
show on the overturned bottom of the stern. Diving expeditions on
the shoals soon may find new evidence of groundings by a ship. SHINING A LIGHT ON HIDDEN TRUTHS In the recent past I do recall that President George Walker Bush spoke of a "THOUSAND POINTS OF LIGHT" to further the progress of our great country. My interpretation of his intent was that the generation of such light should come from our able citizenry, and mainly through daily contributions in thought, word and deed to our society…and most notably in the form of volunteerism. Many of us have responded and experienced success or failure, together with criticism having either justified or unjustified bases. In the latter case, some unwarranted criticism has been based on rumor filling a vacuous state of disinformation and a general lack of appreciation regarding our motivational goals…especially when directed at our volunteer group known as CASUALTY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES (CRA). We are composed of senior citizens and other having comprehensive technical credentials and experience in the maritime field and, as retirees of sound mind, we have freedom of thought and action unrestricted by management constraints affecting income and tenure. While one of our initial goals was to develop an objective three-part "cradle-to-the-grave" historical documentary covering the development, construction and operation of S.S. EDMUND FITZGERALD, our investigatory efforts have experienced considerable difficulty for reasons not fully expressed by knowledgeable persons ranging from the shipyard tradesmen to executive and government regulatory levels. (i.e. "Gag" orders prevalent). Based on these circumstances
our original investigatory scope has been expanded to encompass "We
don't know what we didn't know" avenues that have led to
startling legerdemain discoveries in our self-motivated search for
truth.
CRA 2009 Requiem for
the Toledo Express (a.k.a. S.S. Edmund Fitzgerald) by Raymond Ramsay,
M.Sc., 2009, 156 pp is the most recent companion account to Ramsay's
For Whom the Bells Toll, 2006. Ray Ramsay holds
no punches and lays out on the table the flaws and conflicting evidence
which were stated following the loss of this great ship. He is now
committed to resurrect the truth so closure can be obtained for the
families and friends of the Fitzgerald and to make the maritime industry
safer for those who follow. Ramsay points out that the Fitzgerald
exceeded guidance of USCG hull design and load limit criteria. Ramsay
exposes continuing and industry wide shipbuilding deficient maintenance
and quality control practices and repair over her short service life
of 17 years. Equally interesting, Ray Ramsay alludes to "gag"
orders at the time of the hearings which still exist preventing and
the truth to be known. These allegations prevent fair compensation
to the Fitzgerald's crew families and inhibit improved and safer hull
designs. More importantly, Ray Ramsay argues a strong case for re-opening
the investigation of the Edmund Fitzgerald. Requiem for the Toledo Express is a must read for all shipwreck students and for those of us that are searching for the truth of the loss of the S.S. Edmund Fitzgerald. Mike TenEyck Post Script: I have become
a colleague and friend of Ray Ramsay among other naval architects,
Great Lake sailors, and marine historians as we work voluntary this
common endeavor. I will be issuing a report before the 34th anniversary
of the Fitzgerald sinking. I am not a book writer, although some have
encouraged me to expand my work and write a book on the truth. For
now my intentions are that I will share with you my report, now titled
Six Bells when my 2009 effort is completed. I say 2009 efforts, as
I will never be done. There are so many mysteries regarding the Fitzgerald
and I am finding that when I get an answer to one question, another
question(s) emerges. I suspect I will be searching for answers of
the loss of the Edmund Fitzgerald until the day I die.
I work at GLEW In the late 1950's job's
were pretty easy to find as Detroit was booming and although by today's
standard the pay might not sound like much but everything was so Curv III CABLE-CONTROLLED UNDERWATER RECOVERY VEHICLE The vehicle pictured at bottom was the first successful remotely operated undersea vehicle. The Cable-controlled Undersea Recovery Vehicle (CURV) was developed in the early 1960's by the former Pasadena Annex of the Naval Ordnance Test Station, one of SSC San Diego's parent laboratories. CURV was designed to recover test ordnance lost off San Clemente Island at depths as great as 2000 feet, but became famous in 1966 with the recovery of an H-bomb off Spain in 2800 feet of water. This sucesss spawned later generations of vehicles designated CURV II, CURV II-B, CURV II-C and CURV III. CURV, now referred to as CURV I, pioneered the concept of undersea teleoperators. At that time, a task force was formed, including representatives from the Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board, the U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage, the Naval Undersea Center, and Seaward, Inc. of Falls Church, Virginia, an engineering consultant firm under contract to the U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage to make a visual survey of the wreckage using the USN CURV III System under contract to the USCG. The CURV III is an unmanned, deep-diving vehicle controlled from the surface and capable of television and still photography. This vehicle made 12 dives with a total of 56 hours 5 minutes bottom time and recorded 43,255 feet of videotape and 985 still color photographs. Typ. 4.67 hours on bottom dive times Hours
before the dive to the Fitz
Conversions
to other units 1,852 metres (exact)
Hull speed, sometimes referred to as displacement speed, is a rule of thumb used to provide an approximate maximum efficient speed for a hull. It is only ever an approximation and only applies where the hull is a fairly traditional displacement design. It is usually described as a speed corresponding to a speed-length ratio of between 1.34 and 1.51 depending on which of the limited sources one refers to. In English units, this may be expressed as: where: "LWL"
is the length of the waterline in feet, and The concept of
hull speed is not used in modern naval architecture, where considerations
of speed-length ratio and Froude number are considered more helpful.
It is still used by amateurs in relation to traditional displacement
hulls.
Fitz-2-2009-CRA
Fitz-CRA-2009 PDF File of Drawing
Naval architecture is an engineering discipline dealing with the design, construction and repair of marine vehicles. Naval architecture involves basic and applied research, design, development, design evaluation and calculations during all stages of the life of a marine vehicle. Preliminary design of the vessel, its detailed design, construction, trials, operation and maintenance, launching and dry-docking are the main activities involved. Ship design calculations are also required for ships being modified (by means of conversion, rebuilding, modernization, or repair). Formulation of safety regulations and damage control rules and the approval and certification of ship designs to meet such statutory and non-statutory requirements are also included in naval architecture.
CRA - Team Leader Updates A statute mile is 5,280
feet in length. To convert from statute to nautical miles a factor of 1.15 is generally used, even though it is not precise. (5,280 feet X 1.15) = 6,072 feet (4.11549...feet less than 1 nautical mile).You could add 4.1 feet for each statute mile to be converted. So the new formula would be: {(5280 feet x 1.15)+ 4.1 feet} divided by 6,076.1 feet = 1 nautical mile.
Underwater Science &
Technology Team - plan dives useing Summer Circulation information
in Lake Superior. Wind speeds and wave heights are listed as seen
on November 10, 1975. High-definition video or HD video refers to any video system of higher resolution than standard-definition (SD) video, and most commonly involves display resolutions of 1280×720 pixels (720p) or 1920×1080 pixels (1080i/1080p). This concepts of high-definition video, as opposed to its specific applications in television broadcast (HDTV), video recording formats (HDCAM, HDCAM-SR, DVCPRO HD, D5 HD, XDCAM HD, HDV and AVCHD), the optical disc delivery system Blu-ray Disc and the video tape format D-VHS. (ROV-CRA). Remote Operating Vehicles
(ROV) and Underwater Components The next step in the underwater intervention evolution is to Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV). A few AUVs are being used by the military, for science, and in the commercial world for survey work. AUVs that actually perform heavy physical tasks are in development. The primary limitation is the power the AUV can carry. Rather than making quantum leaps to AUV technology, ROV systems will evolve to hybrid systems. Control and feedback will continue to be provided through thin fiber umbilicals, with power carried on board and charged by stations on the lakefloor. The measure of stability of a vehicle is conveyed by the assessment of the moment required to change the pitch angle of the vehicle. It is characterized by the equation: m = (W) BG Sin , where:
(CRA) V = Velocity in feet per second (1 knot) = 1.689 feet/second Official Web Site for
our ship's weather reports on the lakes 2008 Great Lakes Treasures
Progams
By Roscoe Clark - Cable
Tv Production - Flint, Michigan DVD on Great Lakes
Live
show for updates and reports with live videos on the lakes E
mail us for times Load
Design for taconite pellets Mid Michigan
ship wreck diver said check the draft marks! - 6" is what I found. The vessel
had a 860,950-cubic-foot cargo hold divided by two nonwatertight transverse
"screen" bulkheads. Taconite Weight of one Taconite
pellet = .009 lbs.
There is 860.950-cubic-foot
of cargo space in the Fitz. Note:
"Did they change the draft marks? 6" is the key"
With the upcoming 50 th anniversary of the launching of the Str. EDMUND FITZGERALD on June 7, 2008, I wish to share some memories of this historic vessel. I was a graduating senior at the Department of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering (NAME), University of Michigan at the time. I was also commodore of the Quarterdeck Society, a student organization at the NAME department. We had our annual banquet at the Michigan Union the night of June 6 th, 1958. Professor L.A. (Cap) Baier had retired as department chairman the year before and was Honorary Chairman at the banquet along with Honorary Commodore, James Robertson, head naval architect at Bethlehem Steel, Quincy, MA . After the banquet the students migrated to my apartment to party on into the night. Cap Baier had been a consultant to the Great Lakes Engineering Works (GLEW) for the design of the stern lines of the EDMIND FITZGERALD, GLEW Hull # 301. As such, he had arranged for the seniors to be invited to attend the launching of this vessel. After only a few hours sleep, my wife and I got up Saturday morning and drove to GLEW at Ecorse, MI. Once inside the gate we were herded, along with a hundred or so other visitors, to an open gondola rail car to witness the launching. The rail cars were positioned such that the ship was off to our right and we were at the stern end. It was to strike the water almost directly in front of us. Naturally, everyone was early in order to get a good spot to watch the launching. It was a long wait with the sun beating down on the observers. I recall a shipyard type water bubbler located about 20 feet from the rail car which looked like an oasis in a desert. This was before the bottled water craze. Each time I tried to get out of the rail car toward the water bubbler, some yard person in charge of crowd control would order me back into the rail car. I recall the ship launching was quite late from its scheduled time. Everyone was thrilled when it finally happened. The side launching of such a large vessel is a sight to behold. As I later experienced in my career, it is not uncommon for such launchings to be delayed. The hull is built on blocks so that workers have access to the bottom. For the launching, a series of sideways slides or "ways" are placed under the hull. The ways are heavily greased so the moving ways will allow the vessel to slide downhill in to the water. The weight of the vessel is transferred from the building blocks to the launching ways by manual driving wooden wedges on the launching ways to lift the hull and transfer the weight. The launching ways are kept from moving by levers at each end, called "triggers" held in place by ropes. Once the weight has been transferred by several rallies of men driving the wedges, the building blocks are removed and everyone is cleared from under the ship. The ropes holding the triggers from moving are simultaneously cut and if everything goes according to plan, the vessel slides down the ways. When the center of the ship passes the edge of the pier, its downhill portion of support collapses and the hull rolls into the water, creating a big splash. When steel is welded, the hot metal shrinks as it cools. The last part of the hull put together is the deck. As the butts are welded, it tends to shrink, kind of like a can opener rolling up a can on a key. This causes the ends to lift up off of the building blocks and transfers some of the vessel's weight on to the middle building blocks. The launch director gets very concerned with the ship ready to slide, held back only by the trigger ropes. The effort to remove the building blocks is frantic. The fact that they carry more weight than originally intended makes them difficult to remove. This is compounded if the launching ways are sitting on soft soil which tends to sink when a load is placed on it. It is easy to see why launching a 6,000 ton behemoth is a big undertaking that is often late. After graduation, I took a job as "naval architect" with R.A. Stearn (RAS). in my home town of Sturgeon Bay, WI. In the winter of 1959-1960, Christy Corporation (now Bay Shipbuilding Co.) received a contract from Oglebay Norton Co, Columbia Transportation Division, to repower the J.R.SENSIBAR. RAS was retained to engineer the repowering. When the vessel left the shipyard that spring, it was under the command of Captain McSorely. I had the pleasure of working with him as director of sea trials on that job. In the winter of 1964-1965, Christy Corporation received a contract from Columbia Transportation Division to re-power and convert the JOSEPH H. FRANTZ from a "straight-decker" to a self-unloader. Again, RAS did the design, including Contract Plans and Specifications for the Owner and Detail Design for the Shipyard. The FRANTZ and the NICOLET were converted to self-unloaders at the same time and were unique as the only vessels to have a single kingpost to support the boom conveyor in contrast to the more conventional A-Frame at that time. They were also the first vessels on the Great Lakes to have a boom conveyor built of pipe sections with a triangular cross section and have hydraulic topping and slewing. This is now an industry standard. When the Frantz left the Shipyard that spring, she was under the command of Captain McSorely. I worked with him on sea trials and made several voyages from the coal transfer dock at South Chicago to the power plant at Oak Creek, WI. As the designer of the kingpost system, I had a problem with Teflon bearings supporting the kingpost and ended up replacing them with bronze lubricated bearings. Though RAS was not the designer of the EDMUND FITZGERALD, we did design several modifications to the vessel. In 1966 we did a study for Oglebay Norton to lengthen the vessel. This was never done. In 1968 we did the engineering to install a bow thruster that winter. In 1969, RAS was asked to investigate the continuing failure of the longitudinal keelsons attachment to the bottom shell plate. Each year a survey would show cracks in the weld of the center vertical keel (CVK) to the bottom shell. These cracks would be gouged out and re-welded only to show the same cracks in the following years. I recall boarding the vessel at the Soo Locks when she was loaded, heading down bound. I had a vibration meter and recording device to measure any movement of the CVK while underway. Consider a steel hull as a long steel box. When a certain energy is applied, the vessel vibrates, much like a tuning fork. The first mode of vibration is torsion. The vessel twists about its longitudinal axis. The second mode of vibration is called "springing". The vessel moves in a vertical plane with two nodes ( locations of no movement) at about the quarter length from each end. Springing is a two-noded vertical hull vibration. This phenomenon is exhibited primarily on long, limber hulls such as Great Lakes bulk carriers and large ocean tankers. When the vessel springs, the middle moves up while the ends move down. This repeats itself in the opposite direction with the middle moving down and the ends moving up. This cyclic motion is normally the reaction of the hull girder to relatively small waves slapping the bow. It can be increased or decreased by changing the frequency of encounter which is done by changing course, changing speed, or both. It can also be excited by an unbalance in engines. Its frequency is dependent upon the vessel's stiffness (Inertia), mass (Displacement) and length. The smaller the ship, the higher the natural frequency. Vessels about 600 feet in length have a natural frequency of about 60 cycles per minute where vessels of about 1000 feet in length have a natural frequency in the low twenty cycles per minute. A vessel may not exhibit this phenomenon in deep water but may show springing when passing over a shoal where the entrained water causes the virtual displacement of the hull to increase. The location of the nodes can be identified as the place on deck where the seagulls sit. They like a smooth ride! After clearing Detour and proceeding onto Lake Huron I recall the curtains in the mess room beginning to sway. One could time the cycles with a stop watch. I grabbed my instruments and made my way down the tunnel walk way to about midships and with the aid of a long power chord crawled down into the empty ballast tank. I left a crew member to stand watch at the manhole in case I didn't come back out. Making my way through the lightening holes in the keelsons I came to the CVK. As each cycle of the springing caused the bottom structure to be in compression, the large panel bounded by the tank top overhead, the bottom shell beneath, and the web frame on each side, showed "panting" or sidewise movement at the center of the panel. The panel would alternately moved port to starboard and repeat itself. It was a classic case of panel buckling. I recorded the frequency and the amplitude of the vibrating panel. Enjoying my ride down Lake Huron, we approached the St. Clair River at Port Huron. Curious to get some measurements in shallow water, I went down into the ballast tank again. At some point in the river, I would swear that the vessel touched bottom. This terrible scrapping sound on the bottom shell on which I was standing scared the living daylights out of me. I left my instruments and scrambled through the lightening holes and up the ladder faster than anyone has ever done. When I told my boss, Dick Stearn, of the incident, he told me to never go into a ballast tank with the vessel moving in shallow water. Something I have never done since. ,As a compression member approaches critical Euler column buckling, its natural frequency goes to zero. It will vibrate at the impressed frequency. This sidewise movement of the vertical panel was causing the weld at the edges of the panel to reach the fatigue limit and fail. The solution was to add two vertical flat bar stiffeners at the one-third spacing from each end to stiffen the panel. This was done and, to my knowledge, stopped the cracking of the welds. In 1970 RAS made Contract Plans and Specifications to convert the power plant fuel from coal to oil. RAS also did the Detail Design of such work in1971. In 1971, RAS also did Contract Plans and Specifications to add a sewage holding tank. This was the last of RAS work on the EDMUND FITZGERALD. After the vessel foundered, all of the drawing files were removed from the RAS office by attorneys from Oglebay Norton Company. I left RAS in 1977 and joined the American Steamship Company in Buffalo, NY. Dick Stearn died in 1985 and the company was sold to John J. McMullen (JJMA) in 1986. The name R.A. Stearn, Inc was retained. I rejoined the company in 1986 as Director of Engineering for JJMA. I purchased the assets in 1996 and renamed the company as Bay Engineering, Inc. Having started working in the shipyard as a lofts man for Christy Corporation in 1947, I have over 60 years of memories.
Pam Johnson daughter of Robert Rafferty Steward
I am so thankful for the
opportunity that came my way this past June to take part in a special
reunion. There were shipbuilders, timely whistleblowers,birthday cake,book
authors, family members, past sailors all in one place honoring the
EDMUND FITZGERALD. I was the lucky one to be invited to share in the
days events. It was 50 years to the day that we stood and heard the
original whistle being blown at the exact moment 50 years later for
the launching of the SS EDMUND FITZGERALD. A good sized crowd filled
the tents afterward to share stories and pizza. It was such an honor
to meet the actual builders of the ship that my dad had the privilege
to cook on. There were artist with their talents everywhere the eye
could see from paintings to an actual wood carving of the ship that
was done so delicately and by hand. I think that impressed me the
most. What an awesome man that did that. I wish you all get the chance
to see his work.
50 Year Anniversary Birthday Cake Play audio report about this program WDET
News Leo Kuschel S.S. Edmund Fitzgerald Image size: 16 x 26
A travel advisory was issued
for The Wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald . This advisory took effect
on December 24, 2007 12:00 AM (UTC) and has no date of expiration.
Patrick B. Pointer The CRA will move the in-depth information to the official web site soon. Radio transmissions from
ship to ship and ship to shore regarding the missing vessel, Audio - Edmund Fitzgerald - PLAY Send us your
Pictures, Movies and Stories to be used on this web site. Bad Design, Bad Steel,
Brittle Fracture: Edmund Fitzgerald by Thomas F. Drouillard Gerard E. Lawson
A group of senior citizens, calling themselves the Seniors Marine Review Committee (SMRC), has met several times a year for the last six years at The Old Sailors Home in Duluth to discuss the storm, the course taken and the sinking of the Edmund Fitzgerald, in an effort to establish a sound and verifiable cause of the casualty. They have re-plotted the course the Fitz took from the time she cleared Otter Head Light, passed Michipicoten and Caribou Islands onto the 141 degree course for Whitefish Bay. They have looked into the prefabricated modular mode of construction, the use of welding rather than rivets to join steel plates and structural members; structural deficiencies the Fitz was plagued with from the time of construction until her demise; the development of weather and sea conditions from the time she departed the ore dock in Superior, Wisconsin until she disappeared from radar two days later; the work ethic, seamanship and reputations of the captain, officers and crew; and a critical review and analysis, based on scientific and engineering principles, of the fractured bow and stern hull sections and debris field from the disintegrated mid-section. The group includes Gerard E. (Jerry) Lawson of Duluth, Minnesota; Captain Dudley J. Paquette of Crown Point, Indiana; Captain Richard E. (Dick) Orgel of Toledo, Ohio; Thomas F. Drouillard of Golden, Colorado; and Joseph Burbul of Foxboro, Wisconsin. This year, the Committee has applied to The Gales of November Committee to hold a panel discussion in which they will discuss their reasons for refuting the established theories and present an outline of their proposal for approval of the surviving family members and permission of the Canadian Government to conduct an improved side scan sonar survey of the wreck and the surrounding area. The results of this survey will be used to plan a scientific dive to the wreck site, exercising total regard for respecting the sanctity of the grave site, to take close-up photographs of the fractured edges of hull plating of the bow and stern sections and the debris field, collect samples of fragmented hull plating from the debris field, and cut selected samples from the open ends of the bow and stern hull sections for metallographic and chemical analyses and for mechanical testing, including determination of the ductile-brittle transition temperature by Charpy V-notch impact testing. Following the panel presentations, the floor will be open for questions and answers.
At no time was there any plot on the part of the industry or the owners to sail any vessel in an unsafe condition. The construction practices, as well as the operational and repair practices, were the normal standards of the industry and had been followed for several decades. Once the industry discovered that there was a lack of strength in these vessels, there was an effort to keep this private and make the changes required to strengthen the ships quietly. The vessels were watched carefully and even to this day, when the gales are blowing, there are very few, if any, ships on the lake. It turns out that what was needed to be done was already under way. The conversion of the ships to self-unloaders gave the hull the additional structural strength needed to make them safe. For example, prior to conversion, the Wilfred Sykes would show some of the cargo hold floor at the amidships area when fully loaded. The Sykes, and many other vessels, carried their cargo in the ends and very little in the middle. The vessel was so limber that if the center was filled during this process, the vessel would sag. After the Sykes was converted, she would load evenly throughout the ship, as she was substantially stiffer and stronger. Captain Paquette stated that after the conversion, the Sykes was a completely different vessel. We cannot fault the owners for the way they handled operations at that time. They were dealing with an unknown vessel condition caused by an unknown structural deficiency, and these are problems which are not solved overnight. The meeting that the industry had, as mentioned in Captain Richard Orgle’s book, The Edmund Fitzgerald Hull Failure, gave them the direction that they would have to follow and those changes were made as soon as could be done. It is easy to point fingers at the industry when we look at the situation in hindsight, but they had to deal with the problem in real time. There is no doubt that they did a good job of it. No owner wants to do anything that will put his vessel at risk. The time has come to return to the wreck of the Fitzgerald and do a scientific survey. We have so much more new knowledge and equipment today than we did in the 1970’s. We believe that we can gather the information to prove once and for all the cause of the loss, but more importantly, vindicate the crew. The Edmund Fitzgerald was NOT lost because the crew failed to properly secure the hatch covers. My daughter and I donated this flag and other items that my Dad had requested to the Corp of Engineers museum next to the Ariel Bridge in Duluth, Minnesota in 2005.
Respectfully, A newspaper article written by George Braatz with the Toledo Blade in the late 60's had some interesting things to say about George "Red" Burgner. Two poems from some guests that rode the Edmund Fitzgerald write: "The cook of the crew
is a man named Red. "And Red, bless his
soul, S. Farrell English 1301 December 7, 2007 The Mystery of the Edmund
Fitzgerald
S.S. Edmund
Fitzgerald
The flagship
of the Oglesbay-Norton fleet sailed for 6857 days on the Great Lakes
carrying iron ore to feed the steel mills of Michigan and Ohio. She
was build at the Great Lakes Engineering Works at River Rouge, Michigan,
Nine miles west of here. When the keel of the Fitzgerald hit the water,
she became the largest freighter to traverse the inland seas, 729
feet long and 75 feet wide. 29 die in the sinking
of the SS Edmund Fitzgerald The Official LIVE broadcast
team for the 2009 special programs Video links Link Page
Special Thanks
to everyone who took part View
Pictures of the Send us your
Pictures, Movies and Stories to be used on this web site.
Special
Event set for this summer
January 26, 2009
Following is my understanding of the scenario he described relative to the separation of bottom shell plates from the center vertical keelson (CVK) and adjacent vertical keelsons (VK) on the Fitzgerald. Also, Mr. Orgel indicated that this separation was a recurring problem. Separation of the bottom shell plates from the VK caused the shell plates to bow downward in a concave manner away from the VK. Shipyard workers pulled the bottom shell plates up to the bottom of the VK and re-welded the shell plates in place. When the pulling/lifting apparatus was removed, the welds fractured and the bottom shell plates again separated from the CVK and the VK. At a loss for a solution, the ship yard crew left the bottom shell plates separated from the CVK and the adjacent VK's, and the Fitzgerald sailed without the problem ever being corrected. I might have an idea why the welds parted once the pulling/lifting apparatus was removed after re-welding. The idea centers around two concepts called Yield Point and Modulus of Elasticity. These concepts are best understood using a cap screw (bolt) as an analogy. When the hex nut is tightened on a bolt clamping parts together, the bolt is placed in tension and is being elongated or stretched. The bolt will elongate and return to its original length and strength any number of times as long as it is not over tightened reaching the Yield Point. If the Yield Point is reached just one time, the bolt will never again return to its original length and strength, but will only continue to elongate or stretch. The Yield Point concept is relative to the Modulus of Elasticity of the material from which the bolt is made. Simply stated, metals (in this case steel) will stretch, but only so far, and will eventually loose their elastic properties and just continue to stretch (increase in length) until the material pulls apart. When the bottom shell plates separated from the VK, the plates were no longer restrained by attachment to the VK. It might be possible that the separated portion of the shell plates were occasionally placed in tension with enough force from torsional inputs acting about the ships longitudinal axis, sagging, lateral bending, or multi-axial stresses from a combination of the forgoing to reach the Yield Point and exceed the Modulus of Elasticity of the material from which the shell plates were made. If so, the separated portion of the shell plates would elongate and "grow" by very small amounts with each tension force input of sufficient magnitude causing the shell plates to bow down even more. In other words, the separated portion of the shell plates were getting longer. When the shipyard workers pulled the bottom shell plates up to the bottom of the VK, they may have been working with a plate that was actually ever so slightly longer than the plate was originally. If so, trying to re-attach the now longer plate into the same position into which a shorter plate had been originally attached, would be akin to placing two pounds of sand into a one pound can. Pulling with enough force to bring the now longer plates up to the bottom of the VK would place unbelievable compression stresses into the bottom plates perhaps even resulting in small amounts of buckling. Once the pulling/lifting apparatus was removed, all of the above stresses would be transferred directly into the welds. If the tensile strength of the welding electrodes used was less than the stresses pulling the shell plates away from the VK, the welds would part immediately. This scenario would make it almost impossible to successfully re-weld the bottom shell plates to the bottom of the VK. Keep in mind once the Yield Point is reached, the tensile forces required to continue elongation are much less than the forces required to reach the Yield Point initially. As a result, once the Modus of Elasticity was exceeded, lesser tensile forces would be required to elongate the shell plates the next time and every time thereafter. If this was the case, as the bottom shell plates continued to elongate by small amounts, the continuing elongation placed greater and greater stresses on the welds of the next VK attached to the bottom shell plates. As elongation continued and the stresses increased, it might have been possible that the next attached VK welds would part and the whole grim affair continued to play out again and again resulting in catastrophic shell plate failure. On page 38 of his book, "For Whom the Bells Toll", Dorrance Publishing Company, 2006, Raymond Ramsay M.Sc., provides the following very interesting commentary: During the Fitzgerald investigatory hearings, the author viewed with concern the general disregard for the input of operating crew members, who spoke of hearing failed rivets "popping" when underway, multi-strand 5/8 inch diameter wire deck fences breaking because of hull hogging deflection, and, with additional concern, of the liner hull "bending and springing." Their disconcerting statements were not "sea story" hearsay, albeit Investigatory Boards showed little concern with taking such testimony in stride. The most interesting part of Mr. Ramsay's observations relative to this discussion is "…hearing failed rivets popping when underway…". What rivets? Even though there were rivets utilized for fastening sheer strakes to shell plates, almost all fastenings on the Fitzgerald were accomplished via welding. The Titanic was of all riveted construction, but more modern ships like the Fitzgerald were of welded construction. Could it be possible that crew members with long years of experience just assumed that ships circa. 1958 vintage were of all or mostly riveted interior construction as I am sure were many of the ships on which they served early in their seafaring careers? Could it be possible these crew members were not aware of the recurring bottom shell plate to VK separation problems and just assumed that the ominous sounds they heard were rivets parting? Could it be possible what crew members were really hearing while underway was the ongoing parting of welds, or portions of welds, retaining the bottom shell plates to the CVK and/or adjacent VK? As Mr. Ramsay
observed above, "…Investigatory Boards showed little concern
with taking such testimony in stride." Like Mr. Ramsay, I am
sure that a judicious cross examination (an investigatory cross examination
not an adversarial cross examination) of their testimony would have
revealed a plethora of very profound data. In short, the truth would
have been self-evident.
Raymond Ramsay Update
Report on the 32nd Special Program GLEW SHIP YARD
WELDER'S MEMORIES See pictures of the 50th & 32nd Edmund Fitzgerald special program. Pictures
of the Day - November 10, 2008 - Michigan
Hi Roscoe can you add my dad's picture to the web site ? his name was Roscoe too but he was called Logie senior . He was a welder helper at Great lakes Engineering SHIP YARD FOR ABOUT TEN YEAR'S. Thank's Logie JR . Michigan Ship Wreck Diver want to tell the full story After Twenty Years - at the bottom of Lake Superior, the bell of the SS Edmund Fitzgerald was brought to Michigan State University for restoration. After the bell was recovered on July 4, a ceremony took place at Whitefish Point on the 7th. Researchers spent one week rubbing, scrubbing, buffing and shining the bell for its appearance at the Michigan State University Museum on July 14-21. The bell is now located at the Great Lakes Shipwreck Museum at Whitefish Point in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan. For more information, contact the Great Lakes Shipwreck Museum's Director Tom Farnquist at 906-492-3392. 2009
S. S. Edmund Fitzgerald special event programs
Official
E
mail us your address and Pictures and
Videos of the 33rd. Memorial service will be here soon. November
10, 2008 S.
S. Edmund Fitzgerald 33rd Agenda on November 10, 2008 2:00 PM Wreath laying ceremony at Linwood Beach Marina 4:00 PM Reception at Third Street Deli 6:30 PM Roundtable Discussion at HS Gym 8:00 PM"10 November Play" at HS Gym 10:15 pm Bell Ringing
Ceremony at Conclusion of the Play
605 W 5th St, Pinconning, MI 48650 (Pinconning Area School District) Linwood Beach Marina: http://www.linwoodbeachmarina.com/html/map.html Directions: Take I-75 North from Saginaw to exit 173, turn Right on to Linwood Road and go East all the way to the end. Turn Right and go south on Linwood Beach Road to Marina. Phone: 989-697-4415
Directions: Take I-75 North from Saginaw to exit 181, turn Right on to Pinconning Road and go East two miles to traffic light at M-13 (you will pass Pinconning High School on the right just before M-13). At traffic light, turn Left and go North on M-13 two blocks and Third Street Deli is on the Right. Phone: 989-879-1236 Directions from Linwood: From Marina, take Linwood Road west to M-13. Turn Right on M-13 and go North ten miles to Pinconning.
Directions: Take I-75 North from Saginaw to exit 181, turn Right on to Pinconning Road and go East 2 miles. School is on the right just before M-13. Links for more information
See past programs
Hi Roscoe, CASH BOX Top 100 Singles
The
Edmund Fitzgerald Crew
Minimum Required Freeboard Every inch
the ship submerges in the water, 112.65 tons of weight must be added.
Amendments to
the Great Lakes Load Line Regulations in 1969, 1971, and 1973 allow
Great As part of the
requirements for obtaining the freeboards assigned on September
13, 1973,
Arthur M. Anderson Upon departure
at 2:15, the FITZGERALD proceeded at full speed of 99 rpm, approximately
Why did the story change for the Official Report? At the Marine
Board Captain Cooper and Chief Mate Clark both testified that the
FITZGERALD was not near the shoal area. Captain Cooper testified
that at 1540 the FITZGERALD was in the position the ANDERSON reached
when she changed course to 141T. This position is well clear of the
shoal. Chief Mate Clark testified that when the ANDERSON changed course
to 141T the FITZGERALD was right on their heading flasher and "Maybe
he didn’t go in there (close to Caribou Island)." Radio Transmissions from ship to ship Listen
The fact remains
that in his most fresh, spontaneous and free report of the accident
to his
One of the last runs for the S.S. Edmund Fitzgerald 1975 NTSB Edmund Fitzgerald Accident Report Marine Casualty Report 1975 Report
HERITAGE CONSERVATION, PROTECTION AND PRESERVATION 1. Carry out archaeological fieldwork. 2. Knowing that a site is a marine or other archaeological site, within the meaning of the regulations, alter the site or remove an artifact or any other physical evidence of past human use or activity from the site. 3. With respect to a marine archaeological site that is prescribed by regulation, i. Dive within 500 metres of the site or within such other distance of the site as may be prescribed by regulation. ii. Operate any type of submersible vehicle, including remotely operated vehicles, autonomous underwater vehicles, submarines or towed survey equipment such as side scan sonars or underwater cameras within 500 metres of the site or within such other distance of the site as may be prescribed by regulation. 2002, c. 18, Sched. F, s. 2 (27); 2005, c. 6, s. 35.
Official News Paper for the 50 Year Anniversary http://www.thegreatlakespilot.com Need more information,
call Roscoe at 810 519-2148 See Videos
of the Edmund Fitzgerald Story. Click here go to next web page. |
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