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How I Learned the Truth
About
The Loss of The Edmund Fitzgerald
By Richard Orgel
In the first of my articles
I wrote about how I happened to be on the Fitz for a short time as a
relief third mate. It was in the fall during the season of bad weather.
We did experience some high winds and waves. I think that is what led
to me being ordered to appear at the Coast Guard Marine Board of Inquiry.
At the Board of Inquiry we all, at least a hundred people, listened
to a very long audio tape recording of a telephone conversation between
Captain Cooper of the steamer Arthur M. Anderson and his company officer.
The tape was submitted as evidence played for the information of the
Marine Board of four Coast Guard Officers. It was recorded by the Anderson
owners, U.S. Steel, at their office in Cleveland shortly after Fitz
was lost. The Anderson was the ship closest to Fitz on the last voyage.
Much of the conversation was about movements of the two ships relative
to each other. Most notable about the conversation was Captain Cooper
saying over and over repeatedly "what do you want me to say?"
He made it quite clear he would say what ever his boss wanted him to
say. That tape is what gave rise to the notion that Fitz struck a shoal
causing fatal damage that led to the hull failure hours later. There
was no credible evidence submitted indicating there was a grounding.
Only what Cooper said when not under oath. When Captain Cooper and his
first mate were under oath they both testified they didn't think Fitz
went near the shoals. Parts of that tape have been played many times
omitting "what do you want me say?" That original tape in
it's entirety appears to have vanished from the Coast Guard transcript
archives in Washington D. C. If this is true then it's another incident
where the Coast Guard destroyed or allowed documents, in their custody,
to be destroyed or removed.
In my second article for "Great Lakes Pilot" I related how
I learned from a Coast Guard Report that there was a top level industry
wide meeting perhaps about a year after Fitz was lost. Nearly all American
and Canadian ore shipping companies attended and funded the meeting.
The results of the meeting was the enactment of the new hull strength
rules and standards of 1978. It would be reasonable to conclude this
summit meeting contemplated the assertions and suggestions that Fitz
grounded or had flooding of the cargo hold by careless, or other wise
not adequate, securing of the cargo hatch covers by the crew. Apparently
they at the top level meeting did not think that was what happened because
there was no new rules made to improve navigation or insure proper securing
of cargo hatches. Their actions focused on improving hull strength.
It would be reasonable to conclude this to be an admission by the industry
that Fitz loss was caused by a hull failure. I also pointed out the
fact that the president of the LCA was also an ex Vice Admiral of the
Coast Guard wrote a false statement in a letter to the Chairman of the
National Transportation Safety Board where he said "Fitz experienced
no abnormally severe weather before the early afternoon of November
10th." Official weather reports along with expert and 100 knots
during the late hours of November 9th, and early hours of November 10th.
Log book records of three U.S. Steel ships on the north shore during
those hours would indicate that. In addition to the Anderson there was
another U.S. Steel ship their Roger Blough. She was a new ship only
three years old. Bigger and more powerful than all the rest. This veteran
master chose to "heave to" to spare his ship storm damage
or worse. It was commonly believed that U.S. Steel was the leading influential
company in the LCA group. It seems odd they didn't advise the LCA spokesman
of the truth of the weather conditions on the north shore more than
a year after Fitz was lost.
To continue on with article number 3 for the Great Lakes Pilot paper.
Written comments about radar observations made by Captain Cooper of
the Anderson by that same LCA president are false and misleading as
were his statements regarding weather on the north shore. He was trying
to influence the NTSB in their report regarding the lost of the Fitz.
Speaking as one who sailed before radar I think it's the greatest invention
ever. The first one I ever saw up close was on a U.S. Maritime Service
Training Ship where I was in training as an officer candidate in 1945.
I didn't' get on a ship equipped with radar until 1952. By the time
many ships on the Great Lakes did have them. At first many captains
would not allow them to be turned on except in limited visibility. They
are a great aid to piloting navigation in all weather especially at
night. Once one has a basic understanding of how civilian mariners use
radar it will become quite clear how misleading the LCA assertions really
were. Now let me submit a technical interruption here to explain some
history and facts about radar. Radar was first invented by the British
and later improved by Americans to detect enemy submarines on the surface
during WWII. The way it is used by civilian mariners is not very complicated
and can be explained to anyone who is interested.
An antenna mounted on a mast above the wheelhouse rotates horizontally
every few seconds. It sends out radio pulses then receives returning
pulses that it transfers to the radar receiver encased in a metal cabinet
in the Wheelhouse. Fixed on top of the cabinet is the radar display
screen. It is similar to a TV tube circular in shape about 12 inches
in diameter. The center of the screen marks the location of the observer's
vessel. From that center is a line to the outer edge of the circular
display that pivots around the center synchronized with the antenna
scanner on top outside. On the display screen it is referred to as the
"sweep." As the sweep rotates around the periphery of the
display screen it highlights (brightens momentarily) land masses and
objects on the sea surface with each rotation. For example another ship
will appear as a small dot on the screen. That will brighten with each
rotation of the sweep. There is another such line extending from the
center to the outer edge of the screen that is stationary. It doesn't
move and marks the track ahead of the ship. It also brightens with each
passing of the sweep making it appear as flashing. It is called the
"heading flasher." The observer (operator of the radar) may
select the range (distance) he wants to use, it may be 3, 6, 12, 24,
or 48 miles in all directions. I think when out in open waters the range
selected is usually 24 miles. The exact true course (direction) and
speed (if any) of that dot (vessel) can not be determined by simple
observation.
Any observed movement of that ship is relative to the course and speed
of the observing vessel. We on the observing ship know our own course
and speed but we cannot determine the course and speed of the other
vessel by simply looking into our display screen. This is a scientific
fact enacted into law. However a very close to true course and speed
of the other ship can be determined by following a procedure known as
"plotting." It is not a complicated procedure. A navigation
tool is a "Plotting Sheet." It is a clear sheet of paper with
a compass card replica (circle showing 360 degrees) for direction and
several concentric rings indicating distance. The trained, tested and
certified radar observer notes several bearings, distance fixes and
their times of the other vessel on the plotting sheet at intervals of
a few minutes. Then he can determine the true course and speed of the
other vessel. He can also determine the "Closest Point of Approach"
CPA, of that vessel and the time that will occur. This is for the purpose
of collision avoidance. Using a plot the watch officer (radar observer)
can readily detect and change of speed or course of that other vessel.
This information cannot be ascertained any other way than making the
plot. All deck officers, including the master, are certified "Radar
Observer." The certificate must be renewed every five years. Mates
are referred to as deck officer or watch officer. Radar plotting is
an important part of a mates job. In my years as a captain I insisted
my mates use the plot then they may not later have moments of agony
regarding our exact position or being certain we are well clear of another
ship in a near collision situation.
This international law and requiring all watch officers to be certified
"radar observers" was the result of a collision of the Italian
Luxury Andrea Doria and the Swedish Cargo Liner Stockholm in American
waters Nantucket, July 1956. Just two ships involved on nearly opposite
courses in fog at nighttime. The simplest situation one could imagine.
Each were radar equipped and in use. Both had the other ship on his
radar display screen. Both thought they could tell what the other was
doing. Both were wrong. They collided, people were killed. The Doria
with all her beauty and art treasures went to the bottom. The International
Maritime Organization IMO investigated and determined that vital information
available by radar could not be ascertained without using a plot. That
became the rule and the law worldwide.
The steamer Anderson was in a most severe storm. The conditions made
radar observations difficult. The radar antenna outside up on top a
mast is swinging in a wide arc as the ship rolled and pitched in the
storm sea. At the display screen it required constant adjustments. As
the vessel rolls hard side the screen may be blotted out by sea return
as the radar detects wave tops. The ships head (bow) and radar heading
flasher is winging wide on each sire of the course they were steering
with high waves from astern. It can be very difficult to make any dependable
radar observations. In spite of all this the president to the LCA ex
Coast Guard Vice Admiral insists that Captain Cooper on the Anderson
could ascertain the position of the Fitz on a shoal, without using any
plot at any time. That is a falsification. Cooper couldn't' do that.
Nobody could.
The following is word for word excerpt taken from the letter by the
president of the LCA to the chairman of the NTB. "If the ineffective
hatch closure is not plausible then what is likely to have happened?
The Coast Guard quickly dismissed the possibility of shoaling near Caribou
Island. The reason given was that an accurate track in that area could
not be determined from the Anderson officer's testimony. Indeed there
was a lack of preciseness that would have been invaluable in proving
or disproving the shoaling theory. The Anderson's master, having no
inkling of serious trouble on the Fitzgerald, did not record the position
of either vessel. Even though not recorded at the time, this experienced
master nonetheless determined from his observations that the Fitzgerald
had passed through the 6 fathom (36 feet) shoal area near Caribou Island.
After the fact, When the Fitzgerald was known to be lost, he did not
broadcast the information by radio, but made a "confidential"
report to his home office by telephone at the first opportunity. His
report was taped by the home office.
The master of the Anderson did not volunteer that information when he
first appeared as witness in the Inquiry but the tape was subsequently
offered to the board by his company because of its pertinence to the
hearing." (end of letter excerpt) These words generate questions
and comment. Why would Captain Cooper not volunteer to pass information
to the Coast Guard Marine Board of Inquiry trying to find why 29 men
lost their lives? Why did Cooper find it necessary to make a "confidential"
report to his home office and not volunteer information to the Coast
Guard? In my experience when the Coast Guard has one under oath trying
to gather information concerning a deadly incident the last question
usually is . . . do you know if any thing we may not have asked you
that might be pertinent to this case? One has to wonder why Captain
Cooper wasn't more cooperative with the Coast Guard in their Inquiry.
The president of the LCA writes the master of the Anderson had no inkling
that Fitz was in trouble and that is why he didn't try to get a accurate
fix of a position. Then he writes nonetheless this experienced master
was able to determine from his observations that Fitz went into the
shoal are of Caribou Island, THE LCA CAN'T HAVE IT BOTH WAYS. Why would
they contradict themselves and look foolish like this in writing so
it cannot be denied? In my opinion they were desperate to escape their
responsibility of a flawed hull. As inept as the LCA letter and position
was, it worked. The public was led to believe the reason for the loss
was an unknown mystery and the crew was somehow, one way or another,
to blame. Unfortunately there were books and TV documentaries that supported
that nonsense. Their families were compensated at the minimum on the
premise the ship was not at fault. Next to the loss of these good men
that was most hurtful and unconscionable. The industry saved millions
of dollars'. They did fix the problem of weak hulls in their own time
budget and convenience. This all happened because of our Federal Safety
Regulators, Coast Guard Inspectors, are often incompetent with impunity.
They never have to answer to anybody. More about his later.
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