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The
Search for the Truth of the
Loss of the Edmund Fitzgerald
My fellow engineers. . . . . . . . .
About this time every year I have the opportunity to share my knowledge
of the wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald with folks like yourselves who
are interested in this "unsolved" shipwreck. I am sure their
interest of this shipwreck is due at least partly to their familiarity
with the lyrics of Gordon Lightfoot's song. However, there are lessons
for us to be learned that include not only fundamental engineering principles,
but the understanding of human behavior and what I believe to be the
manipulation of others in business and some parts of government to protect
self serving interests. The facts and conclusions I present are my own
and do not necessarily reflect the views of my company, customers, or
my family. I present them to you for reflection on the subject of engineering
truths.
These are the reasons why I believe the large 729 foot ship, made famous
by Gordon Lightfoot and known by many as the finest of the American
side, went down in a huge November storm on Lake Superior. I list them
in order of recall obtained from the many documents I have read in those
musty-smelling marine libraries and the conversations with lake sailors
(many of them unshaven and more often than not toothless, heard over
a brew at the local smoke-filled ship's tavern near the closest pier),
as they convincingly described what I write below. Although the official
government's position of the loss of the Edmund Fitzgerald (affectionately
called the Fitz by those who knew this large and elegant ship) was the
loss of buoyancy due to leaking or damaged hatches. The Lake Carrier
Associations (made up of sea faring people whose interest are to the
sailors and not the lawyers or insurance companies, i.e. big business),
believe the Fitz hit the shoals near Caribou Island in Lake Superior
on that fateful day of November 10, 1975, to take on water and later
sink. I uncompromisingly agree with them.
1.) The Fitz reported taking on water shortly after passing close to
the shoals a little after 3:00 p.m. These shoals were reported to be
at a depth of 36 feet of water. The Fitzgerald's draft was 27 feet.
In the huge sea, the Fitz could easily plunge down 9 feet hitting bottom.
The Fitzgerald did not have a depth reading gauge. If it did hit bottom,
the crew would most likely not feel nor be able to hear the impact due
to the creaking of the Fitz hull as she flexed in this heavy sea. In
an attempt to justify that the shoals did not cause the grounding of
the Fitz, the government subsequently resurveyed the shoals, since it
is the Coast Guard's responsibility to have accurate marine maps made.
To their embarrassment, the actual boundaries and depth of the shoals
were different than existing navigation maps. However, the Coast Guard
then said that no rubbing marks from a ship could be found on the shoals
(Ha! Like finding a needle in a haystack even if marks existed after
years of the smoothing wave action on any mark that might have been
made.), and reaffirmed their position that the Fitz most likely did
not hit the shoals and the most likely cause of the loss of the Fitz
was still leaking hatches.
2.) Captain Cooper, of the Arthur Anderson (another large ore carrier),
which was trailing the Fitz by about 10 miles, noted this close encounter
with the shoals by the Fitz, and specifically told his wheelsman to
steer farther from the shoals. He was so sure the Fitz was lost due
to hitting those shoals, he refused to state that reason over the wireless
phones as he was risking his own life and the ship in search of Fitz's
survivors later that night. Upon arriving at the Soo Locks, he called
his home office on the privacy of secured telephone and expressed to
his bosses his belief of what had happened. Under oath in the court
of inquiry on the loss of the Fitzgerald, he stated for the first time
in public his views on what happened that fateful night.
3.) Over the next four hours, the sea worsened and the Fitz's material
condition degraded as was reported by the ship's crew.
4.) The Fitz's skipper, Captain McSorely, reported this was the worst
storm he had ever seen. It was a big storm and although the sea built
up 40-45 foot waves with winds up to 75 mph as reported by the Anderson,
and sometimes gusts to 90 mph, as logged by the Coast Guard at Soo Control,
others who were in the same storm believed this was not the worst storm
that Captain McSorely had ever been in over his greater than 30 years
of lake sailing. However, Captain McSorely reported it was the biggest
storm ever. Why then? Either one or both of these two situations were
occurring. The Fitz was losing freeboard (lowering in the water due
to sinking) or perhaps, consciously or subconsciously Captain McSorely
knew his damage and therefore, was rationalizing his potential fate
as so many helpless people have done. Also, as the ship lower in the
water from sinking, the sea would give an impression of being bigger.
For example, an 18-wheeler looks bigger from a Volkswagen than a pickup
truck.
5.) The Fitz slowed down after starting to take on water so the Anderson
could close in on her. Leaking hatches should have never placed the
ship in grave danger; however, if leaking was occurring and was a concern,
getting to shelter to reduce leaking would be the number one priority
and a ship under these conditions would seek shelter as quickly as possible.
However, if the ship was structurally damaged and the skipper knew that,
he would slow down to mitigate stresses on the ship and if he feared
losing the ship, at least the Anderson would be closer to pick up survivors.
Captain McSorely chose to slow down.
6.) On October 31, 1975, 10 days before the sinking, the Coast Guard
did a pre-winter marine inspection of the Fitz and found no serious
material deficiencies and specifically, no problems with the hatches
that required immediate repair. The Edmund Fitzgerald was authorized
to continue carry ore for the rest of the 1975 season. These end-of-season
inspections are done more as a "courtesy" for the owners of
the ships so problems can be fixed during the winter lay up while the
northern part of the Great Lakes are frozen over and before the next
spring's mandatory inspection and certification. However, visual inspection
of the Fitz's undamaged portion of her hull as she lays in her grave,
shows no damaged hatches and those hatches visible are secured by the
hatch clamps indicating the crew had secured all hatches after loading
the 26,000 long tons of taconite ore. It is worthy to note that visual
inspections do show some clamps not fastened; however the hatch cover
still remains installed.
7.) Even if the hatches were leaking or damaged from the sea, the design
and construction of the lake freighter would have allowed easy and safe
access inspection from the underside (as shown below).
8.) The Fitz reported nothing about leaking hatches. As the ship experienced
loss of buoyancy and if it was due to leaking hatches, Captain McSorely
would have no doubt reported that as the reason to the Anderson. He
probably would of loved to blame the sea as a cause of his problems,
as his job security would not have been nearly as jeopardized due to
the act of an unfriendly God that fateful day. However, if he believed
he was sinking due to his error of passing too close to the shoals,
he wouldn't broadcast that fact over his wireless phones so all could
hear. Especially, for his boss to hear!
9.) As Captain McSorely was talking on his wireless phone, his voice
indicated anxiety and fear from a man that knew he and his ship were
in grave danger. This correlates with his reported worsening ship damage
(i.e., list, vents down, railing down, and then both radars gone).
10.) Taconite ore absorbs water 3-17% by weight. This additional weight
would most definitely lower the ship and would not necessarily indicate
visible water in the cargo hold coming from a hole in the bottom of
the ship. However, water from leaking hatches would be visible (see
figure below)
11.) The last message from the Fitz was a reply to Captain Cooper's
question, "How are you doing with your problem?" The Fitz
replied at about 7:10 p.m. "That we are holding our own".
Words like that frequently mean, I won't admit the seriousness of the
situation. These words and a tone of voice that was heard in the pilothouse
of the Anderson indicated fear of a crew that knew they were doomed.
12.) A few minutes later, Captain Cooper of the Anderson looked into
his radar and the Fitz was not on the screen.
13.) Some have said that the Fitz split in two - like the ore freighters
Daniel Morrell that sunk in 1966 in Lake Huron and the Carl Bradley
that sunk in 1958 in Lake Michigan. However, these two ships broke in
two by brittle fracture and did not sink immediately and in fact stayed
afloat for greater than five minutes. Survivors of both of these two
ships reported this fact. The pieces of each ship are miles apart and
the crew had time to put on life vests. However, as the figure below
shows the main pieces of the Fitzgerald to be close together demonstrating
almost instantaneously sinking of both parts of this great ship.
14.) As Lightfoot sings:
The Legend lives on from the Chippewa on down
Of the big lake they called Gitche Gume
Superior they said never gives up her dead
When the gales of November come early.
The early Native Americans did not know chemistry or biology but they
knew that human bodies from drowning were never recovered from the cold
water of Lake Superior, but bodies did surface from drowning in Lake
Michigan, Huron, Erie, and Ontario. If water is warm, the biological
decomposition of the body creates gas that is trapped in the body which
causes the body to rise. No bodies were found from the Edmund Fitzgerald.
If the ship broke in two like the Bradley or Morrell or slowly sank
from water through damaged hatch(s), sufficient time to put on life
vests would have occurred and at least bodies with life vests would
have been found. All of the Fitz's victims are kept in the icy tomb
that the Chippewa's call Gitche Gume indicating no time existed for
the crew of the Fitzgerald to put life vests on.
15.) The Bradley and Morrell hulls were made from high sulfur steel,
thereby, being brittle and investigation of those two ships did indicate
brittle fracture failure of the hulls. However, the Fitz (built and
commissioned in 1958 and I had the opportunity to see this largest ship
of her time on her maiden voyage as she passed up bound through the
Soo Locks) was made of ductile steel, post World War II vintage and
great holes from brittle fracture would not occur, but only the slower
tearing of the hull from the energy of the sea. As I earlier mentioned,
those two older freighters stayed afloat more than 5 minutes after breaking
in two as reported by survivors. The effective hole from tearing action
of the Fitzgerald's ductile steel would be smaller than the gapping
area of brittle fracture, thus providing more time to abandon ship and
possibly save some crewmen.
16.) As my drawing above shows, the forward section of the Fitz hull
is heading southeast, the same direction of the sea, the course she
was steering for the safety of the entrance to Whitefish Bay and the
St. Mary's River and onto the locks at Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan. The
stem section (upside down) lies 170 feet from the bow section. This
clearly demonstrates that the ship did not break in two and float apart.
The wreckage of the mid section of the Fitz is mangled and part of the
26,000 tons of taconite ore lies in this vicinity. The bow section also
is hard-nosed into the bottom of one of the shallowest parts (550 feet)
of Lake Superior. These figures showing the final resting place of this
great ship indicates that the Edmund Fitzgerald finally lost enough
buoyancy and dove into the sea as any submarine sailor would know. The
stern section rose as the bow went down and the shear weight of the
after section containing the 7,500 shaft horse power steam propulsion
plant broke off and sank. The continuing revolution of the shaft that
turned the 20-foot propeller may have caused the stern section to spiral
and end upside down at its final resting place. My crude math using
a slide rule and not one of these young college kid's computer shows
that the final moments of the Fitz were from 20 to 120 seconds. However,
the bow section where the captain communicates to the outside world
never recovered from the dive and therefore, no SOS (or May Day) could
be made and none were heard.
17.) The final driving force to cause the Fitz to nose dive to her death
was from the weight of the waves coming over the stern-rolling over
the deck and pushing the forward part of this ship down. The break could
have occurred at the beginning of the plunge or as she plunged to the
bottom of the lake. To further compound this affect, the next wave coming
under her stern would have a tendency to raise the stern further pushing
the bow of the Fitz even more of a down angle until she drove so hard
that she could not recover. Captain Cooper of the Anderson noticed a
particular large wave coming over his ship and he even wondered if his
great ship would pull back up. That largest of noted waves was then
headed toward the Fitz and 20-30 minutes later is when he lost contact
with the Fitzgerald. Was this the last and most fierce wave that finally
caused the Fitz to submarine?
18.) I have personally inspected the two lifeboats recovered from the
Fitz. The lifeboats are stowed on the aft section of the hull. One is
badly mangled from the energy of the sea and the banging from against
the hull of the Fitz as she broke loose. The other lifeboat looks like
Hell - cut in half and the steel hull of this lifeboat looks like a
Great Lake monster bit the lifeboat in two. Maybe, the lifeboat was
cut in two by the turning propeller of the Fitz as both were plunging
to the bottom.
19.) The final government reports (Coast Guard and the National Transportation
Safety Board Reports) don't make any specific recommendations to change
the design of the hatches - only to check the hatches. The Fitz had
a government inspector check her hatches just 10 days before the loss
of this ship. The inspection showed nothing wrong with the Fitz hatches
that required immediate repair. If these agencies of the government
really thought hatches were to blame, why don't they demand a redesign
of the hatches for future ships? They did not! Interestingly, they strongly
encourage ship owners to install depth gauges and also within a year
rescinded approval for these ships to carry additional ore that these
ships were originally design to carry. This rescinding order is passive
admitting that ship owners and the Coast Guard had not adequately engineered
the effects (structural and water loading over the hatches and other
parts of the hull) on ships-like Edmund Fitzgerald- when they allowed
these ships to ride lower (more than three feet lower than originally
designed) in the water in order to carry more cargo.
I encourage every engineer to reflect on the technical and human behavior
surrounding the loss of the Edmund Fitzgerald and appropriately deal
objectively in determining the truth of every problem one meets in their
life. We are fortunate that we work in an environment of uncompromising
candor that was pioneered by Admiral Rickover. However, we must never
forget to use our discipline of engineering, our knowledge of human
behavior, and horse sense to seek and obtain the truth. Don't let big
business, your management and leaders including me, the government,
or the wash job of others from understanding the truth. For unsolved
problems, we, as engineers, must continue to persevere and relentlessly
examine known facts as they become available to come to the truth and
never allow non-technical bureaucrats make the final decision of our
life's work.
Good night.
Mike
November 10, 1996 - 11:30 p.m. (over a sip of brandy with my two dogs
at my feet)
"21st year following the Loss of the Edmund Fitzgerald"
We
welcome Mike TenEyck, a contributing writer to our newspaper. Mike graduated
from Sault Ste. Marie High school in 1960. He is a graduate of Michigan
Technological University (BS Applied Physics 1964 and MS Nuclear Engineering
1966). He is a Professional Engineer registered in the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania and the State of Idaho. He completed 35 years working
for the United Stated Nuclear Navy. His travels took him to over 30
nuclear submarines and several of our country's largest nuclear air
craft carriers.
He comes from a sea and Great Lake sailing family of over 600 years.
His father, John Stuart TenEyck and uncle, Milton TenEyck were both
captains on the Great Lakes and both were inducted in the Great Lakes
Lore Maritime Museum (Roger City, Michigan) in 2006.
In addition to his professional life, Mike has contributed to his local
community. He is past presidents of the Idaho Falls Youth Hockey (1989-1995)
and the Idaho Amateur Hockey Association (1987-2003), past district
direct of USA Hockey, and refereed and coached for most of his adult
life. He continues to stay busy as a retiree by being on the Idaho Falls
United Way board of directors, owner of TenEyck Distributing (distributor
of AMSOIL Synthetic Lubricants and AgGrand Natural Organic Fertilizer),
and part time nuclear consulting. He enjoys Dutch oven cooking, camping,
hiking, fishing, and hunting in the beautiful Rocky Mountains-and needless
to say reading and providing reviews. He has two grown children, Doug
(34) and Kevin (30) and one grandchild Colby (11). He and his wife,
Mary Ellen, live in Idaho Falls, Idaho.
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