4-19-08

Bad Design, Bad Steel, Brittle Fracture:
The Cause of the Sinking of the

Edmund Fitzgerald

by

Thomas F. Drouillard

Gerard E. Lawson

Ever since the sinking of the Edmund Fitzgerald on the evening of November 10, 1975, an aura of mystery has prevailed. What caused the “Big Fitz” to disappear from radar during a terrible storm on Lake Superior just 17 miles from safe harbor in Whitefish Bay? The tragic event has been immortalized in song by the Canadian balladeer Gordon Lightfoot, written about by many distinguished authors and historians, and celebrated annually on the anniversary of the sinking in many cities around the Great Lakes. The Gales of November in Duluth, Minnesota was established in 1987 to celebrate the anniversary. Each year people come to Duluth to learn if there is anything new as to the cause of the casualty. We have all heard the traditional theories proposed by the US Coast Guard and the NTSB in their official reports, and the Lake Carriers’ Association (LCA) in their rebuttal letter to the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard’s was loss of buoyancy due to massive flooding of the cargo hold resulting from ineffective hatch closures. The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was sudden massive flooding of the cargo hold due to the collapse of one or more hatch covers. The LCA concluded the Fitz bottomed out on Six-Fathom Shoal located off the north end of Caribou Island, holing the vessel's balast tanks. The vessel filled up gradually to a point where buoyancy was marginal when a combination of one or more large waves -- Three Sisters -- raised the stern starting the bow to dive under water, never to recover. Any one of these scenarios would have given ample time to put out a mayday call and allow crew members to don lifejackets.

A group of senior citizens, calling themselves the Seniors Marine Review Committee (SMRC), has met several times a year for the last six years at The Old Sailors Home in Duluth to discuss the storm, the course taken and the sinking of the Edmund Fitzgerald, in an effort to establish a sound and verifiable cause of the casualty. They have re-plotted the course the Fitz took from the time she cleared Otter Head Light, passed Michipicoten and Caribou Islands onto the 141 degree course for Whitefish Bay. They have looked into the prefabricated modular mode of construction, the use of welding rather than rivets to join steel plates and structural members; structural deficiencies the Fitz was plagued with from the time of construction until her demise; the development of weather and sea conditions from the time she departed the ore dock in Superior, Wisconsin until she disappeared from radar two days later; the work ethic, seamanship and reputations of the captain, officers and crew; and a critical review and analysis, based on scientific and engineering principles, of the fractured bow and stern hull sections and debris field from the disintegrated mid-section.

The group includes Gerard E. (Jerry) Lawson of Duluth, Minnesota; Captain Dudley J. Paquette of Crown Point, Indiana; Captain Richard E. (Dick) Orgel of Toledo, Ohio; Thomas F. Drouillard of Golden, Colorado; and Joseph Burbul of Foxboro, Wisconsin.

This year, the Committee has applied to The Gales of November Committee to hold a panel discussion in which they will discuss their reasons for refuting the established theories and present an outline of their proposal for approval of the surviving family members and permission of the Canadian Government to conduct an improved side scan sonar survey of the wreck and the surrounding area. The results of this survey will be used to plan a scientific dive to the wreck site, exercising total regard for respecting the sanctity of the grave site, to take close-up photographs of the fractured edges of hull plating of the bow and stern sections and the debris field, collect samples of fragmented hull plating from the debris field, and cut selected samples from the open ends of the bow and stern hull sections for metallographic and chemical analyses and for mechanical testing, including determination of the ductile-brittle transition temperature by Charpy V-notch impact testing.

Following the panel presentations, the floor will be open for questions and answers.

Now, all of the above being said, let us look at how we arrived at where we are today. When the Fitzgerald was designed, there was no engineering for a 730-foot ship. The industry simply did a straight-line extrapolation of the existing engineering, we would assume, from the engineering for the triple A class ships. This seemed a reasonable thing to do. There were no significant problems until the ships were allowed to load substantially deeper and, in the case of the Fitzgerald, add additional cargo of close to 4,000 long tons. When this was done, any safety margins for the hull were gone. The added weight caused accelerated stress and wear on the hull structure. The industry was not aware of this, as they did not know what they had in the first place. The first time that there was a known problem with the keel was in the winter of 1963. At this time there was a separation of the longitudinal members from the bottom plating. This was not just at the centerline keel, it was every longitudinal member from port to starboard for a distance varying from 6 to 12 feet. The repair was done by placing an A-frame appliance over the longitudinal member and welding it to the bottom shell plate. A jack was then placed between the top of the member and the A-frame and the bottom plating pulled up approximately ¾ inch to close the gap so that fillet welds could be made to secure a permanent attachment. The problem with this is that it placed a serve stress on this weld and the separation continued for the life of the vessel. This weakened condition combined with the flawed design of the ship, mixed with the unusual severity of the storm on November 9th and 10th, caused the loss of the Edmund Fitzgerald. When you add to this mixture the very good possibility of low-temperature brittle fracture, the probable cause of the loss becomes clear.

At no time was there any plot on the part of the industry or the owners to sail any vessel in an unsafe condition. The construction practices, as well as the operational and repair practices, were the normal standards of the industry and had been followed for several decades. Once the industry discovered that there was a lack of strength in these vessels, there was an effort to keep this private and make the changes required to strengthen the ships quietly. The vessels were watched carefully and even to this day, when the gales are blowing, there are very few, if any, ships on the lake. It turns out that what was needed to be done was already under way. The conversion of the ships to self-unloaders gave the hull the additional structural strength needed to make them safe. For example, prior to conversion, the Wilfred Sykes would show some of the cargo hold floor at the amidships area when fully loaded. The Sykes, and many other vessels, carried their cargo in the ends and very little in the middle. The vessel was so limber that if the center was filled during this process, the vessel would sag. After the Sykes was converted, she would load evenly throughout the ship, as she was substantially stiffer and stronger. Captain Paquette stated that after the conversion, the Sykes was a completely different vessel.

We cannot fault the owners for the way they handled operations at that time. They were dealing with an unknown vessel condition caused by an unknown structural deficiency, and these are problems which are not solved overnight. The meeting that the industry had, as mentioned in Captain Richard Orgle’s book, The Edmund Fitzgerald Hull Failure, gave them the direction that they would have to follow and those changes were made as soon as could be done. It is easy to point fingers at the industry when we look at the situation in hindsight, but they had to deal with the problem in real time. There is no doubt that they did a good job of it. No owner wants to do anything that will put his vessel at risk.

The time has come to return to the wreck of the Fitzgerald and do a scientific survey. We have so much more new knowledge and equipment today than we did in the 1970’s. We believe that we can gather the information to prove once and for all the cause of the loss, but more importantly, vindicate the crew. The Edmund Fitzgerald was NOT lost because the crew failed to properly secure the hatch covers.

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